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Abstract Frege taught us how to understand one form of predication: an atemporal
one. There is also a different, temporal form of predication, which I briefly intro-
duce. Accordingly, there are two fundamentally different approaches to time: a
reductive one, aiming to account for time in terms of Frege’s atemporal predication,
and a non-reductive one, insisting that the temporal form of predication is sui
generis, and that time is to be understood in its terms. I do not directly argue for or
against reductionism in this paper. Rather, by evaluating the debates on enduran-
tism–perdurantism, A-theory–B-theory, and presentism–eternalism, I argue that
these debates, although aiming to be fundamental, largely boil down to mere
quarrels between alternative reductive approaches. We should take notice of this
fact and reorient ourselves within the debate on time accordingly: the real issue is
whether we should reduce or not. I briefly sketch in what sense endurantism,
A-theory, and presentism may be developed on a properly anti-reductionist basis.
Keywords Time  Presentism  A-theory  Endurantism  Predication 
Reductionism
1 Introduction
With this article, I aim to contribute to clarifying what exactly is at stake in (large
portions of) contemporary philosophy of time. In particular, I will argue that most
disputes on the nature of time in the end boil down to a clash between two radically
different and incompatible conceptions of time. The first conception can be character-
ized as geometrical in nature: time is understood as a dimension of reality that provides
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locations for reality’s inhabitants in much the same way spatial dimensions do. The
second conception takes time to be a sui generis form of being, or, as I will say, a formal
concept characterizing a sui generis form of predication. That temporal form of
predication constitutes the unity of temporal truths or facts, which differs from the unity
of atemporal truths or facts (such as geometrical truths). Juxtaposing these two
conceptions of time, it transpires that the first, geometrical approach is reductive in the
following sense: it takes the unity of temporal truths or facts, in the final analysis, to be
the same as that of atemporal truths or facts. The reductive view thus aims to account for
time in terms of an atemporal form of predication, while its non-reductive counterpart
recognizes a specifically temporal form of predication.1
I will explain and defend this way of framing the metaphysical discussion on
time in what follows. It is not my aim to make a case for or against either one of
these perspectives on time, although my presentation is not neutral—I take the anti-
reductionist approach to be correct, but I leave my arguments to that effect for
another occasion. My purpose here is, rather, to contribute to a clearer understand-
ing of what exactly is at stake in the relevant parts of the philosophy of time.
The plan is as follows. I first sketch the anti-reductionist and reductionist
positions (in Sects. 2, 3), and then zoom in on three strands of debate in
contemporary philosophy of time: endurantism–perdurantism, A-theory–B-theory,
and eternalism–presentism (in Sects. 4, 5, 6). In particular, my discussion of
A-theory in Sect. 5 centers around Fine’s (2005b) classification thereof, and on the
general idea of the passage of time. And my discussion of presentism in Sect. 6
critically assesses the supposed unity of present-tensed truths that many contem-
porary writers adopt from Arthur Prior’s (1957, 1967, 1968b) tense logic.
As it turns out, these three debates largely boil down to disagreements within a
reductionist setting, and thus fail to capture the fundamental issue of whether or not
we can reduce—despite the strong anti-reductionist leanings of most defenders of
endurantism, A-theory, and presentism. Still, endurantism, A-theory and presentism
do form part of a non-reductive view: I briefly sketch how they relate to the
temporal form of predication in Sect. 7.2
2 The Original Temporal Nexus
One of Frege’s important contributions to philosophy is his identification and
clarification of a particular form of predication: the one that unites concepts
(Begriffe) with objects (Gegensta¨nde) in a way that can be adequately characterized
1 It will be clear, from this statement of my aims in this paper, that I assume the philosophy of time to be
investigating the objective nature of time itself—not our experience of time, or something such. In that
sense, I assume some form of realism—testified by my seemingly sloppy use of the phrase ‘‘temporal
truths or facts’’. I intend to show that there are, ultimately, two ways of spelling out such a realism about
time: a reductive and a non-reductive one. For reasons of scope, I cannot inquire whether this assumption
of realism is justified.—Thanks to an anonymous referee for pointing out the need to clarify this.
2 My discussion proceeds in large part in terms of (temporal and atemporal) truths exemplifying diverse forms of
predication. However, I do not mean to encourage a ‘linguistic’ reading of these locutions. One may substitute
‘‘judgment’’ or ‘‘instantiation’’ or ‘‘exemplification’’ for ‘‘predication’’, and ‘‘(true) thought’’ or ‘‘(true) proposition’’
or ‘‘fact’’ for ‘‘truth’’. I believe (but will not argue here) that it all comes down to the same. See my (2013, 2014).
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as function application. His concomitant concepts Begriff and Gegenstand are
categories, or formal concepts: they characterize the form of predication Frege was
concerned with.3 Many analytic philosophers explicitly or implicitly take the
Fregean form of predication as the only form of predication, or at least as the only
fundamental form of predication. For reasons that will soon become apparent, I will
call this form of predication atemporal predication.
It will be useful to clarify the relation of these Fregean categories to his form of
predication. A basic Fregean thought consists of a concept applied to the right
number of objects. That is the general form of Fregean thoughts, which gives rise to
a hierarchy of more specific forms (such as quantified thoughts and higher-order
thoughts). This general form of Fregean thoughts thus includes a distinction
between thought-elements of the concept-kind and those of the object-kind. Nothing
is a Fregean thought if it does not include a concept and (the right number of)
objects, and conversely, nothing can be a concept (or an object) in this formal sense
if it does not figure in Fregean thoughts. It is in this sense that the Fregean form of
predication gives rise to formal categories.
I will shortly introduce another form of predication that fundamentally differs
from Frege’s atemporal one. It is a specifically temporal form of predication, and it
comes with its own formal categories—temporal categories.4 What I aim to show in
this paper is that the question whether this temporal form of predication is
fundamental or not is crucial for the metaphysical debate on time. If the temporal
form of predication is indeed fundamental, a philosophical account of time basically
consists in clarifying that form of predication and its concomitant categories,
analogous (though not similar) to Frege’s clarification of atemporal predication. If it
is not, we are in need of a reductive account of the temporal form of predication and
its categories, in terms of the Fregean form of atemporal predication. In the first
case, we aim for a non-reductive theory of time, in the second case for a reductive
theory. Let us see what it exactly is that can or cannot be reduced.
Our temporal reality is occupied by interacting, moving, changing objects. As
they interact, change, and move about, time passes. We can contrast this reality with
an atemporal reality we may pretend to imagine. Such an atemporal reality is not a
covertly temporal reality in which everything stays the same (if such a thing is
possible at all) but rather a reality to which no temporal concepts apply at all. Let us
take the Euclidean plane as an example. It includes points, lines, circles, triangles,
and all sorts of other geometrical figures. These objects do not interact, move, or
change—and that is no unfortunate accident but rather one of the constitutive
characteristics of such geometrical entities.
Truths about the geometrical inhabitants of our imagined atemporal reality
exemplify Frege’s atemporal form of predication (indicated by [square brackets]):
‘‘Triangle t [is] right-angled’’, ‘‘Circle c [lies within] square s’’, etc. Truths about
physical objects that inhabit reality exemplify a different form of predication
3 For a much more detailed description of this particular aspect of Frege’s theory of predication, see
Thompson (2008, Introduction) and Mulder (2014, esp. chs. 3 and 4).
4 For a detailed development and defense of this form of predication and the categories that come with it,
see Ro¨dl (2012). This paper is mainly inspired by Ro¨dl’s work.
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(indicated by the absence of square brackets): ‘‘the glass is on the table’’, ‘‘the glass
is falling to the ground’’, ‘‘the glass has fallen to the ground’’, ‘‘the glass was on the
table’’.
The most striking prima facie difference between these two forms of predication
is the following. The atemporal form of predication is uniform: there is only one
way in which it can unite a given predicate (a Begriff) with a (suitable) number of
given objects (Gegensta¨nde). Not so for the temporal form of predication, which is
differentiated in two ways. First, it is differentiated in tense: object(s) and predicate
can be joined in a present-tensed way and in a past-tensed way.5 However, these two
ways are intimately connected: one can say the very same thing by first saying ‘‘the
glass is on the table’’ and later saying ‘‘the glass was on the table’’.6 After all, if I
yesterday stated that ‘‘the glass is on the table’’, you can question my statement
today by claiming that ‘‘the glass was not on the table’’. In such a case, we are in
genuine disagreement only if, using the latter sentence today, you are negating the
very same thought I expressed yesterday, using the former sentence.—It is clear,
therefore, that this form of predication, unlike the atemporal one, cannot be
adequately characterized as function application.
Secondly, the temporal form of predication is also differentiated in aspect: it can
unite object(s) and predicate in a progressive and in a perfective way. Again, these
two ways are intimately, but differently, connected. The progressive ‘‘the glass is
falling to the ground’’ expresses a process that is still unfolding, one that reaches its
completion when ‘‘the glass has fallen to the ground’’ is true. However, there is no
guarantee that it does—for instance, someone may catch the glass in mid-air, in
which case only the past-tensed progressive ‘‘the glass was falling to the ground’’ is
true, and not the perfective ‘‘the glass has fallen to the ground’’.7 The latter does
imply the former, however.
Perhaps this example is found to be artificial: the process in question could also
be described simply as ‘‘the glass is falling’’, in which case there seems to be no
natural state of completion implied (although one could argue that there still is,
given the nature of falling, or, more generally, the nature of gravity). A better
example would be ‘‘Jim is crossing the street’’, which could be frustrated by his
being hit by lightning when half-way. Such a process does imply a state of
completion (with Jim on the other side of the street). However, this example
depends on Jim’s intentions, which invites questions concerning the nature of
intentional action that fall outside of the scope of this article. But perhaps the
following will do: suppose I take an ice-cube out of the freezer and put it on my
desk. ‘‘The ice is melting’’ now gives expression to what is happening to the ice (I
usually keep my desk under normal atmospheric pressure at around room
temperature). After a while, ‘‘The ice has melted’’ expresses that the process of
melting has come to its completion. But I could, of course, have put the ice cube
5 For reasons of scope, and to keep things relatively simple, I omit discussion of the future tense along
with the many interesting questions concerning (in)determinism it invites.
6 I present my examples by using quoted sentences, but, as the present point illustrates, I intend to
thereby present thoughts (statements, propositions), and not the sentences themselves. That is why I can
say that by using two different sentences one can say the same thing.
7 In linguistics, this is called the ‘imperfective paradox’. See Dowty (1977).
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back into the freezer at any point during the melting process, thereby interrupting it
before completion.8
The temporal form of predication thus distinguishes processes from states: states
require, for their expression, only a differentiation in tense, while processes allow
for a further differentiation in aspect. Moreover, processes always already include
some duration: if a glass is falling off the table (or if ice is melting), this implies that
there has already been some stretch of falling (or of melting)—however short it may
be. Of course, processes can be interrupted at any stage: something may stop the
glass from falling further, or stop the ice from melting further. This is different from
preventing the glass from falling at all, or preventing the ice from melting in the
first place. Wherever there is a process, there is some duration. Thus, wherever there
is a process, there is persistence of the objects involved: they remain the same over
time as the bearers of that process.9
At this point, these observations are just that—observations. One may be inclined
to think that they can be nicely captured in terms of the Fregean, atemporal form of
predication, or one may be inclined to take these observations as underwriting one
or another version of, say, A-theory or presentism or endurantism familiar from the
literature. In what follows, I hope to contribute to a better understanding of how we
arrive at either of these two kinds of views. In order to be able to do so, however, we
first have to clarify what exactly these observations can tell us before we start
interpreting them in one of these two ways. If we thus take the prima facie
differences between our two forms of predication seriously, we can distill a couple
of categories that attach to the temporal form of predication, much in the way in
which Frege’s categories of Begriff and Gegenstand can be distilled from his
atemporal form of predication.
First, there is the category of substance: the analogue of Frege’s Gegenstand
category. Then, we have two categories of predicables, state and activity: analogues
of Frege’s Begriff category. The difference between these two categories is indeed a
formal one: state-ascriptions, such as ‘‘being on’’, only allow for (and require)
tensed differentiation, while activity-ascriptions, such as ‘‘falling to(wards)’’ also
allow for (and require) aspectual differentiation.10
8 Thanks to an anonymous referee for pointing out the need for more examples here.
9 Those rejecting the very idea of persisting objects will object. They will take the phenomenon of
persistence as something unreal, to be explained in different terms. One way to do so would be, perhaps,
in terms of pure processes: processes that do not attach to any underlying object, but only to further
processes (see, e.g., Whitehead (1929) and his contemporary followers, including Sellars (1981a, b, c),
Rescher (1996, 2000), Bickhard (2011a, b)). That would be a limiting case of endorsing the temporal
form of predication I am sketching here. But others will be skeptical of such a notion of process as well.
As I said at the outset, I am assuming a generic form of realism concerning time, so I will ignore those
questioning that reality. Yet one may acknowledge the reality of time and still resist the thought that
objects persist by being cross-temporally identical. We will see below that the reductive perspective on
time, which attempts to capture the forms of thought based on the temporal form of predication in
atemporal terms, naturally takes such a shape.
10 Further categories can be distilled here. The counterpart of an activity (e.g., ‘‘falling’’) is a process,
that can be the subject of state-ascriptions of its own (‘‘the falling is/was fast’’). Then, activities and
substances can be combined modally: ‘‘the glass can fall’’—these are powers. These further formal
concepts, however, are not my present topic. See Ro¨dl (2012, esp. Part II) for detailed discussion.
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These temporal categories collectively constitute what I call the original
temporal nexus: a family of formal concepts centered around the form of predication
that constitutes the unity of temporal thoughts, analogous to the family of formal
concepts centered around Frege’s form of predication, which constitutes the unity of
Fregean thoughts (Gedanken). The temporal categories cannot be understood in
isolation from each other; they form a conceptual circle that can only be elucidated
‘from within’—for the same reason why Frege’s more abstract system of categories
forms such a conceptual circle: they all pertain to one and the same form of
predication.
So much for an impressionistic sketch of the form of predication that constitutes
the basis of the original temporal nexus. The temporal anti-reductionist holds that
this form of predication is fundamental. Let us call his view the original view. At
this point, I haven’t filled in the details of this original view. It is natural to think that
A-theory and/or endurantism and/or presentism are ways of defending this original
view, and it is precisely my aim to assess to what extent that is true in the rest of this
paper. The temporal reductionist, on the other hand, thinks that the relevant
temporal concepts and distinctions can be captured, ultimately, in terms of Frege’s
unitary, atemporal form of predication. I will call this the reductive view. Let us see
how such a reduction might work.
3 Temporal Reductionism
The thought underlying the reductive view is that the original temporal nexus,
which we sketched in barest outline above, needs to be accounted for: it should be
understood in terms that do not themselves reside in that very conceptual nexus.
Differently put, the sketched temporal conceptual order is to be grounded in an
underlying real order that can be fully understood by using only Frege’s atemporal
form of predication. That is, roughly, what I have in mind when I call the intended
understandings of time reductive: the original temporal nexus is not accepted as
capturing a sui generis defining aspect of reality. Only Frege’s atemporal nexus is
thus accepted.11
There is, perhaps, no better way of sketching the picture such a reductive
approach to time departs from than by quoting the opening passage of David
Lewis’s On the Plurality of Worlds. It nicely displays the thought of someone to
whom the reductive view comes very naturally:
The world we live in is a very inclusive thing. Every stick and every stone you
have ever seen is part of it. ... There is nothing so far away from us as not to be
part of our world. Anything at any distance at all is to be included. Likewise
the world is inclusive in time. No ... long-gone primordial clouds of plasma are
too far in the past, nor are the dead dark stars too far in the future, to be part of
11 One could read John McTaggart’s (1908) famous conclusion that time is ‘unreal’ as based on an
argument to the effect that there is no satisfactory way to tie the original temporal nexus to an underlying
atemporal reality. For critical discussion of the separation between the conceptual and the real that the
reductionist assumes, see Ellis (2005) and Mulder (2012, 2014).
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this same world. ... [N]othing is so alien in kind as not to be part of our world,
provided only that it does exist at some distance and direction from here, or at
some time before or after or simultaneous with now. (Lewis 1986, p. 2; my
emphasis)
Lewis here displays the most straightforward implementation of the reductive
approach: take the atemporal, geometrical order of space, and append time as
another, similar dimension to that order. Varieties of the resulting ‘four-
dimensionalism’ are widely endorsed amongst contemporary analytic
metaphysicians.12
The result of this procedure is a view on time that rests exclusively on the
atemporal form of predication we contrasted the original temporal nexus with in the
previous section—as I will now show by briefly explaining how this approach gives
rise to the three views that I am mostly concerned with in this paper: eternalism,
B-theory, and perdurantism.
Recall geometrical figures on the Euclidean plane: the plane as a whole provides
the locations for such figures—it is the big two-dimensional container that
[contains] all of them (as before, [square brackets] indicate Frege’s atemporal form
of predication). Similarly, on the view under consideration, reality is to be thought
of as providing ‘spatiotemporal’ locations for its inhabitant objects—it is the big
four-dimensional container that [contains] all of them. Thus, we have eternalism:
everything past, present and future [belongs] to reality as a whole.
The typical form temporal statements then take involves a specification of the
relevant temporal location(s)—either absolutely (‘‘the glass [is] on the table on
2016-6-17, 11:29:41’’) or relationally (‘‘the glass [is] on the table before it [is] in the
kitchen’’). In both cases, the temporality consists in such location-specification, the
form of predication used is thus atemporal. In other words, we have B-theory:
temporal truths are tenseless (or are grounded in truths that are tenseless).
Interestingly, it is only temporal location-specification that comes with such
atemporality—whether or not something is before or after something else doesn’t
change. Spatial location-specifications are subject to change, of course, and hence
require the temporal form of predication (unless we start conceiving of such objects
as having temporal parts—which is the view we now turn to).
Just as a geometrical figure can be understood to occupy an extended region of
the Euclidean plane by having, for each subregion of that extended region, a part
(ultimately, points) occupying that subregion, physical objects on this orthodox
four-dimensionalist view occupy their entire four-dimensional location by having,
for each subregion of that location, a part (ultimately, mereological atoms)
occupying just that subregion. In other words, we have perdurantism: things persist
by having temporal parts at every time at which they exist.13 This allows for a
12 See, e.g., Quine (1960); Lewis (1986, 1991); Hawley (2002); Sider (2001, 2012); Chalmers (2012);
Williamson (2013). Most of these urge that the temporal dimension is not the same as the spatial
dimensions—but often don’t have convincing means to say wherein the difference then lies. E.g., Sider
(2001, p. 216) suggests that the difference ‘might even be primitive’.
13 Here I ignore several complications and subtleties, such as the possibility of gunk without
mereological atoms, the possibility of temporally extended mereological atoms (which would not persist
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treatment of temporal truth completely analogous to ‘locational’ truth: ‘‘the poker
[is] hot at time t’’ and ‘‘the poker [is] hot at location l’’ are both true (supposing that
they indeed are) because the poker has a part at the relevant location (t resp. l) that is
hot.
On this threefold basis, of eternalism, B-theory, and perdurantism, the
reductionist may proceed to capture further features of the original temporal nexus.
With regard to tense, for instance, there are various options. Traditionally, it has
been held that tensed statements are to be understood as tenseless statements
involving a kind of self-reflexive element.14 So-called ‘new’ B-theorists reject such
an eliminative reduction; they want to keep tense on board as a genuine conceptual
ingredient of temporal thought, but without claiming that reality itself is somehow
tensed: our temporal thoughts are then taken to be irreducibly tensed, without this
implying that a B-theoretic account of their truthmakers (or grounds) is false or
incomplete.15 Aspect is more difficult to construct satisfactorily: the idea of
temporal locations (or of temporal extension) does not help to distinguish processes
that reach their completion from those that do not. However, aspect is mostly
ignored or overlooked in the debate anyway.16 Perhaps a subjectivist/pragmatic
approach in terms of expected outcomes of events that may or may not correspond
with their actual future continuation will do (I will leave the details to those
concerned with developing the reductive view).
There is considerable debate on all three mentioned dimensions of the reductive
view. Apart from quarrels amongst proponents of the reductive view itself (such as
exdurantism vs. perdurantism), there is a persistent minority opposing some or all of
the three, and defending presentism, A-theory and/or endurantism instead. One
might assume, now, that these opposing views form part of the original view.
However, I challenge that assumption. The original view is indeed inconsistent with
Footnote 13 continued
by having temporal parts, but still occupy their spatiotemporal region), and the possibility of identifying
the objects with their spatiotemporal regions. Notice, though, that such an identification comes natural to
those attracted to four-dimensionalism. Sider (2001, p. 110), for instance, writes that ‘‘[t]he identification
of spatiotemporal objects with the regions is just crying out to be made.’’ Compare, again, geometry: a
triangle on the Euclidean plane is naturally thought of as identical with the region its constituent lines (or
points) occupy on the plane itself. In other words: it is just part of the plane.
14 On such a construction, your statement ‘‘I am reading now’’, for instance, is true just if the reported
event of reading [is] simultaneous with the statement itself. This ‘token-reflexive’ reduction of tense to
B-relations has been defended, e.g., by Russell (1919, 1941), Reichenbach (1947, §§50–51), Williams
(1951, p. 463), Ayer (1956, pp. 152–153), and Smart (1963, pp. 132–142).
15 See, e.g., Lewis (1979), Oaklander (1991), Oaklander and Smith (1994), Mellor (1998). Zimmerman
(2005) uses this kind of view for his argument that A-theory has to involve more than just ‘taking tense
seriously’. This change in the B-theorist’s strategy illustrates the broader movement from philosophy of
language to metaphysics. Whereas earlier the issue between A-theory and B-theory concerned the
question whether or not the tenses could be analyzed away from our language, now the issue is taken to
concern whether or not the tenses play any role in the truth-makers for our (perhaps irreducibly tensed)
true thoughts and utterances.
16 But see Boccardi (2015, §4), who admittedly doesn’t mention aspect but does argue that genuine
dynamicity in one’s account of time requires obedience to what he calls ‘Plato’s Principle’: ‘‘nothing can
undergo a (comparative) change [perfective aspect] if it is never found in a state of changing [progressive
aspect] before the change has been produced’’.
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eternalism, B-theory and perdurantism, for the simple reason that these views are
built on atemporal predication, not on the temporal form of predication that
constitutes the core of the original view. But that doesn’t imply that presentism,
A-theory and endurantism are parts of the original view. For, as we will see, all
three of these views, both when taken separately and when taken together, can be
understood in such a way as to not involve temporal predication but rather the
reductionist’s atemporal form of predication—albeit in much less obvious ways.
Such reductive versions of presentism, A-theory and endurantism are, in effect,
‘unorthodox’ forms of the reductive approach whose ‘orthodox’ form I just
sketched. Yet it seems that the motivation for such unorthodox views derives from a
dissatisfaction with the way in which reductionism reduces time to merely another
dimension, grounds tensed truths in tenseless truths, and reduces persistence to mere
concatenations of temporal parts. That reductive picture provides, in the eyes of the
opposing minority, an unsatisfactory view on reality as a four-dimensional,
completely static ‘block universe’.
Given these observations, we would do well to recalibrate the discussion on time
so as to better track the reductionism/anti-reductionism opposition. In order to make
my case for this conclusion, I consider all three of the mentioned debates in a bit
more detail. I start with a discussion of persistence in Sect. 4. I show that at least
some respectable versions of endurantism amount to mere variations on a reductive
understanding of persistence. The only version of endurantism which promises to
yield a genuine alternative to perdurantism is a version that combines endurantism
with A-theory, and therefore I move on to discuss A-theory in Sect. 5. As it turns
out, A-theory, at least on some respectable versions of that view, rests upon a
reductive understanding of tense. The only version of A-theory which promises to
yield a genuine alternative to B-theory is a version that combines A-theory with
presentism, and therefore I move on to discuss presentism in Sect. 6. Now, even
here, it turns out that presentism can easily be understood in such a way as to
incorporate the very same reductive notion of being temporally located that was
troubling A-theory.
Having thus assimilated all of the seemingly opposing views into the reductive
view itself, the question remains what, then, the corresponding components of the
original view are. In some sense, endurantism, A-theory and presentism do form part
of the original view, but only when developed on the basis of its defining, temporal
form of predication—not on the basis of some (perhaps tacitly) assumed common
ground with the reductionist. Within the original view, there is no conceptual room
for such common ground, no room for mapping the apparent oppositions
perdurantism/endurantism, B-theory/A-theory and eternalism/presentism. Hence
my conclusion: at bottom, the issue is whether or not reduction is possible. All else
is mere quarrels within the reductionist’s camp. I end this paper by briefly
remarking on the way in which the original view does incorporate endurantism,




Endurantism and perdurantism are competing views on persistence. Enduring
objects ‘‘sweep through’’ their life-time, perduring objects are ‘‘spread out’’ over
their life-time; endurantists hold that persisting objects do so by being wholly
present at each time at which they exist, while perdurantists hold that persisting
objects do so by being partly present at each time at which they exist. Those are the
typical slogans.17 I will now introduce a rather unorthodox way of arriving at certain
versions of these two competing views that makes clear their shared reductive
background.18
Consider a simple temporal statement: ‘‘a is F’’. A B-theoretic, reductive
rendering of that statement is: ‘‘a [is] F at t’’—the temporal form of predication gets
replaces by the atemporal form, and instead a temporal reference makes its
appearance. The intuitive thought behind this move is as follows: at a certain
position on the time line, t, it holds that a [is] F. However, the resulting statement
shows that that intuitive thought is not as clear as it seems. For that statement has
the (Fregean) form of a two-place relational predication: F suddenly no longer
stands for a property of a, instead, it relates a and t. It seems that something got lost
in this translation.19
One can dismiss this worry, and hold that all temporal predications indeed
involve such a (perhaps hidden) extra argument place for times. This leads to a
position on persistence that I call time-relative endurantism. But one can also try to
resolve the worry by somehow eliminating the temporal reference. There appear to
be two options: building the temporal reference into the object (yielding at [is] F),
and building the temporal reference into the predicate (yielding a [is] Ft). The first
option results in perdurantism, the second in what one could call property-based
endurantism. Property-based endurantism is, arguably, no more than a variant of
time-relative endurantism, and therefore I will not discuss it separately in what
follows.20
17 To separate the two views on the basis of acceptance or rejection of temporal parts in this way is not
entirely adequate. As Katherine Hawley observed (2002, §1.6), endurantists may in principle accept
temporal parts on top of enduring things, and perdurantists may in principle even reject temporal parts in
favor of temporally extended but (mereologically) atomic perduring things. Her alternative criterion is in
terms of acceptance or rejection of an atemporal notion of parthood: perdurantists accept that things can
have parts simpliciter while endurantists insist that, for persisting things, parthood is always time-relative.
This nuance, however, does not make much difference to my considerations below.
18 I take my cue here from Ro¨dl ( 2012, ch. 3, §2).
19 This is the basis for Lewis’s famous ‘argument from temporary intrinsics’ against the endurantist—see
his (1986, esp. pp. 202–204) and (2002). The literature on this argument can be misleading, because
intrinsics aren’t really the issue. See Eddon (2010), who shows that the argument rests on the claim that
the endurantist must say that the fundamental features of persisting things (intrinsic or not) are all
relations involving times.
20 Endurantist views of the time-relative variety have been defended by Mellor (1981, ch. 7) and van
Inwagen (1990), and are considered in a sympathetic manner by Rychter (2008), Eddon (2010). Though
we should note that Mellor abandoned the view, in later work, because it seemed to him to allow things
having properties relative to times at which they do not exist. See Mellor (1998, ch. 8). I should mention a
third option—building the temporal reference into the copula: a [is]t F. This ‘adverbialist’ proposal has
been offered by Johnston (1987), Lowe (1987, 1988), Haslanger (1989). However, it is unclear whether
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As my presentation suggests, these three views on persistence can be taken as
alternative ways of endorsing B-theory. As such, they share a common reductive
background picture of temporality: temporal thoughts are understood in terms of the
atemporal form of predication. Therefore, the objects that figure in such temporal
thoughts fall under Frege’s category of Gegensta¨nde, not under the category of
substances pertaining to the temporal form of predication. (Recall that categories are
defined by reference to the form of predication to which they belong.) As such, we
should expect to find that all such objects are exhaustively described by an (infinite)
set of atemporal truths—just like a number, say, can be so described.21 And that is
indeed what we find.
For the perdurantist, the relevant objects are all the momentary time-slices
(temporally extended composite things derive their temporal properties from their
constitutive time slices). Each of them comes with its own set of truths regarding its
properties, and these truths are all atemporal truths having forms like ‘‘at [is] F’’.
They can be said to exist in time by being located at some specific point on the time
line.
For time-relative endurantism, the basic temporal objects are neither time slices
nor temporally extended things, but something more abstract altogether. As Rychter
writes regarding a ripening banana from a time-relative endurantist point of view:
[A]n atemporal perspective will show the banana somehow outside time, and
bearing different relations to different times. These are the relations in virtue
of which, from a temporal perspective, the banana has different colors at
different times. (Rychter 2008, p. 165)
Here, the ‘atemporal perspective’ is the metaphysically fundamental one, it is the
one by virtue of which there is a ‘temporal perspective’ in the first place. From the
atemporal perspective, they are ‘outside of time’ in the sense that that perspective
shows, in good reductionist fashion, by virtue of what they are ‘in time’. As in the
case of the perdurantist’s time-slices, then, every temporal object comes with its
own set of truths regarding its properties at various times, and these truths are all
atemporal truths having forms like ‘‘a [is] F at t’’.
Endurantism, when understood along the sketched lines, is a reductive view on
persistence. Like perdurantism, which reduces persistence to series of time slices, it
reduces persistence to series of relations to times. In this guise, the perdurantism/
endurantism debate is a debate that is internal to the reductive perspective: it is a
debate about which construal of B-theory is to be preferred.
Footnote 20 continued
this proposal is just a roundabout way of reintroducing the temporal form of predication (that is, it is
unclear whether ‘‘[is]t’’ = ‘‘is’’). Anyway, adverbialism usually comes with A-theory, whereas I here
consider endurantism apart from that further commitment. For critical discussion of the adverbialist view,
see, e.g., Hawley (2002, §1.5).
21 By contrast, of substances, things to which the temporal form of predication applies, the history up
until now can be exhaustively described by an (infinite) set of temporal truths. There is no atemporal
perspective from which to describe substances.
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Or is this conclusion too fast? After all, there are those who defend endurantism
by rejecting B-theory.22 Interestingly, one can find writers in the persistence debate
insisting that such a move amounts to withdrawing from the debate over persistence
altogether. For example, here is Hawley insisting that the basis for the debate is the
acceptability of ‘atemporal talk’:
Both endurance and perdurance theorists will accept that the yellow banana
used to be the green banana, although the theories can give different atemporal
descriptions of the underlying reality so long as atemporal talk is permitted. ...
If we are only permitted to talk about how things are [now], then the most we
can do in speaking of persistence is to speak of the histories and futures of
objects .... We cannot assert or deny claims of identity between objects
existing at different times, and thus endurance theory is unformulable.
(Hawley 2002, pp. 31–32)
Hawley claims that rival theories of persistence offer ‘different atemporal
descriptions of the underlying reality’: she thus makes clear that she demands the
participants in the debate over persistence to adopt a reductive stance (in my sense).
In response to those insisting on an A-theory-based version of endurantism, she
writes:
Those who adopt an irreducibly tensed view of the temporal world, and do not
accept that a tenseless description can ever be even partially adequate need
have no truck with the debate between endurance and perdurance theories.
(Hawley 2002, p. 34)
If Hawley is right, the notion of endurance cannot be used to develop a position that
opposes the reductive view. Unless, of course, we can provide it with a content that
differs from what we have seen so far: with content that does not depend on the
reductive stance. The only suggestion we now have in that direction is to start with
A-theory. Let us see how A-theory fares.
5 Tense
The basic thought of A-theory is that tense plays a fundamental role in the
constitution of temporal reality. Thus, although B-theoretical rephrasings of tensed
truths are not by themselves objectionable, the B-theoretical claim that such
rephrasings are, metaphysically speaking, the basis for temporal reality, is
objectionable.
Arguably, the best-known versions of A-theory combine A-theory with
presentism.23 However, as with my discussion of endurantism above, I here choose
to introduce A-theory in an atypical way, in order to show in what guises it comes
22 See, for instance, Merricks (1994, 2007), Zimmerman (1998).
23 See, for instance, Prior (1957, 1967), Geach (1966), Chisholm (1990a, b), McCall (1994), Lowe (1998,




down to being reductive in nature. Whether the addition of presentism makes a
difference will be my topic in the next section—but, given the close connections
between A-theory and presentism, my treatment of them cannot be fully separate: I
postpone some of the considerations relevant to A-theory until the next section (in
particular, concerning Prior’s tense-logical understanding of tense, since that will
take us to the heart of the reductive view), and I will include some considerations
here that already involve presentism (in particular, concerning Prior’s presentist
conception of passage).
The eternalist says that everything past, present, and future is part of the big four-
dimensional container that is reality. It is natural, then, to adopt a B-theoretic
rendering of temporal facts: they are temporal not by form, for they involve the
atemporal form of predication, but by being located somewhere or other in the big
four-dimensional container. That location is specified in some way or other in their
contents. I will now show that it is equally possible, although more complicated, to
adopt an A-theoretic rendering of such facts: such an A-theory will then be a
reductive A-theory.
A useful starting point is Kit Fine’s intriguing paper on the reality of tense, in
which he explicitly separates his topic from (‘ontic’) presentism:
Ontic presentism is an ontological position; it is a view about what there is.
[A-theory],24 on the other hand, is a metaphysical rather than an ontological
position; it is a view about how things are, quite apart from what there is. ...
Moreover, ontic presentism is a negative view; it excludes certain things from
what there is. [A-theory], on the other hand, is a positive view; it includes
certain ways of being in how things are. ... It is readily possible for [an
A-theorist] not to be an ontic presentist. ... He merely insists that some of the
facts (if not all) should concern how things presently are. (Fine
2005b, pp. 299–300; terminologically adapted)
From this starting point, Fine develops and discusses three distinct versions of
A-theory, that I will use as examples of non-obviously reductive A-theories. Fine
takes tensed facts to have forms like ‘‘a is F’’, ‘‘it was the case that a is F’’, ‘‘it will
be the case that a is F’’, etc. That is, he takes them to have the forms that Arthur
Prior captured in his famous tense logic: p, Pp, Fp, etc.25 These are the kinds of
‘perspectival’ facts that B-theorists would take to be grounded in atemporal facts of
the form ‘‘a [is] F at t’’. B-theory thus resolves the perspectival character of such
tensed facts. On the first version of A-theory Fine discusses, standard A-theory, the
perspectival character is retained: standard A-theory presupposes that the present
moment is privileged. (It is easy to see that this version of A-theory makes for a
good match with presentism.)
24 Fine talks about ‘(tense-theoretic) realism’ instead of ‘A-theory’. For clarity, I will continue to speak
of A-theory, and adapt Fine’s terminology accordingly, using [square brackets] to indicate such
replacements in quotes from his paper.
25 See, e.g., Prior (1957, 1967, 1968b), and of course Prior’s posthumously published collection of essays




In addition, Fine describes ‘non-standard’ versions of A-theory, on which there is
no such privileging of a particular moment. On such a view, not only the tensed
facts of the present moment are included in reality, but also the tensed facts of all
other moments. On Fine’s understanding of what it is for tensed facts to belong to
reality, this creates a problem of anchoring: which tensed fact belongs to which
moment? Moreover, without such anchoring, a problem of coherence arises as well:
‘‘a is F’’ and ‘‘a is not F’’ may both belong to reality, despite contradicting each
other. There are two options for dealing with these problems, yielding two versions
of non-standard A-theory: external relativism and fragmentalism. According to the
external relativist, there are at bottom many realities, corresponding to moments in
time, each with its own collection of tensed facts.26 According to the fragmentalist,
there is one ‘u¨ber-reality’, which is incoherent, and decomposes into coherent
fragments (that roughly correspond to the relativist’s many realities).27
Some observations are in order. First, what the standard A-theorist takes to be the
whole of reality—all the tensed facts about past, present, and future—is just one of
the many realities (fragments) for the relativist (fragmentalist). Secondly, and
relatedly, the non-standard A-theories incorporate a massive multiplication of what
appear to be the very same facts. Consider: amongst yesterdays’s facts there is the
fact that it is (at that time) raining. Amongst today’s facts there is the fact that it was
raining. These are the very same fact (as I noted already in Sect. 2 above, and will
illustrate further below), yet for the non-standard realists, they are not—they don’t
even belong to the same reality (and are likely not always in the same fragment).
And thirdly, this, in turn, raises the question why we should assume the many
realities (or fragments) to mesh in the natural way: if today’s collection of tensed
facts (about past, present, and future) is entirely disjoint from tomorrow’s collection
of tensed facts, it seems perfectly fine for today’s reality to contain the fact that it is
raining while tomorrow’s reality contains the fact that it was not raining.28
Fine does not address this last issue. It is perhaps natural to appeal to the axioms
of Prior’s tense logic in order to deal with them, such as p ! FPp. However, these
principles apply only within each of the many realities (or fragments). They don’t
help for our ‘cross-reality’ (or ‘cross-fragment’) worries.
That such worries arise is a clear sign that something has gone wrong. What has
disappeared from sight is the dynamic unity of temporal facts: their cross-temporal
26 External relativism contrasts with internal relativism. B-theory can be considered a version of internal
relativism: which tensed facts hold is relative to the moments on the time line. Such a relativism is
internal because it is explained by reference to an underlying absolute stratum of (in this case tenseless)
facts. The external relativist rejects such an underlying absolute reality.
27 I say ‘‘roughly’’, because for the fragmentalist, the fragments need not correspond to times. The
fragments may overlap, and they may contain tensed facts belonging to different times. For Fine, this is a
reason to prefer fragmentalism: it makes sense from a relativistic point of view, since it does not rely on a
notion of absolute simultaneity.
28 A further observation: the standard A-theorist can allow for the future to be open (in the sense that
there simply are no future-tensed contingent facts), while the non-standard A-theorist can only allow for
such openness in a very peculiar way—the relativist, say, can hold that relative to today’s reality it is
indeterminate whether or not there will be a sea battle tomorrow, while relative to tomorrow’s reality the
fact holds that there is a sea battle going on. Such ‘relative openness’ is not likely what defenders of an
open future are looking for (although Pooley (2013, §VI) seems to think otherwise).
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sameness. That is the result of the shortcoming in Prior’s tense-logical understand-
ing of temporal truths I have just indicated. I will come back to this in the next
section; first, we should look into a more general worry of dynamicity: the famous
(and notorious) idea that time passes.29
Fine uses the idea of passage in one of his arguments in favor of non-standard
A-theory. To that effect, he critically reflects on standard A-theory as follows:
[G]iven a complete tenseless description of reality, then what does [the
standard A-theorist] need to add to the description to render it complete by his
own lights? The answer is that he need add nothing beyond the fact that a
given time t is present .... But then how could this solitary ‘dynamic’ fact ... be
sufficient to account for the passage of time? ... [H]is conception of temporal
reality, once it is seen for what it is, is as static or block-like as the [B-
theorist]’s, the only difference lying in the fact that his block has a privileged
centre. Even if presentness is allowed to shed its light upon the world, there is
nothing in his metaphysics to prevent that light being ‘frozen’ on a particular
moment of time. (Fine 2005b, pp. 286–287)
It becomes evident, at this point, that the version of standard A-theory Fine here
considers comes down to what is often called moving spotlight theory.30 Its moving
spotlight is supposed to account for the passage of time—but, as Fine rightly
remarks, adding tensed facts only provides the spotlight theorist with a spotlight, not
with its movement.
What is remarkable about this form of A-theory is that it first accepts an eternalist
construal of how truths relate to times, and then seeks to rescue the cherished
dynamicity of time by adding tensed facts. The situation is similar to that in the case
of the endurantisms I surveyed above: there, we noticed that they first adopt a
B-theoretic/eternalist understanding of temporal truth, and then seek to rescue the
diachronic identity of persisting things.
The question Fine poses is, thus, indeed an important one for the moving
spotlight theorist: he may say that the tensed fact he adds to the tenseless description
is ‘dynamic’, i.e., that the spotlight ‘moves’, but the tensedness of the fact itself does
not seem to do the trick (which, to repeat, indicates that there is something peculiar
about the kind of tensedness involved). Moreover, given this predicament, it is clear
that replacing all the B-theoretic facts by tensed facts does not make much
difference either.31
29 I should warn the interested reader at this point: I will not be able to provide a satisfactorily developed
account of the passage of time in this paper. That is not my aim in this paper; I’m in the end merely using
the idea of passage to clarify differences between a reductive and non-reductive approach to time.
30 For C.D. Broad’s original image of the moving spotlight view, see Broad (1923, p. 59). Defenders of
something like the moving spotlight theory include Russell (1915), Smith (1993, 2002), Craig (2000).
Moreover, Skow (2009) attempts to make moving spotlight theory compatible with special relativity.
31 In fact, the whole idea of a moving spotlight is deeply confused: it tacitly introduces an extra temporal
dimension, in which the spotlight moves, which exists apart from the time line itself. (Broad 1923, p. 60)
already observed this; see also (Williams 1951, pp. 463–464), and Markosian (1993) for a more recent
discussion of this argument. Skow (2009) argues that the alleged extra temporal dimension can be cashed
out in terms of tensed truths concerning the ‘real’ time line—but see Pooley (2013, §IV) for convincing
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Interestingly, Fine takes the non-standard A-theories to fare better in this respect:
For the external relativist, each time is objectively present at that time: at each
time t, reality is constituted by the absolute fact that t is present .... And for the
fragmentalist, each time t is objectively present simpliciter—i.e., reality is
constituted by the absolute fact that t is present .... But in either case,
presentness, in so far as it is a genuine feature of reality, applies equally to all
times. Presentness is not frozen on a particular moment of time and the light it
sheds is spread equitably throughout all time. (Fine 2005b, pp. 287–288)
Fine of course knows that such an equal distribution of presentness over all times
does not suffice as an adequate account of the passage of time, but he nevertheless
takes it to be an improvement in comparison to the situation of the standard
A-theorist:
[A]t least, on the current view, there is no obvious impediment to accounting
for the passage of time in terms of a successive now. We have assembled all
the relevant NOWs, so to speak, even if there remains some question as to why
the relationship between them should be taken to constitute a genuine form of
succession. (Fine 2005b, p. 288)
Fine’s line of thought here is not convincing. For consider: the moving spotlight
theorist may have a problem of ‘frozenness’, but, at least, there is room for the
spotlight to move in. Non-standard A-theorists make things worse by incorporating
the presentness of every moment into the moment itself: now there is no room
anymore for the spotlight to move in. Its beam is widened so as to illuminate all
times ‘at once’—but it is just as ‘frozen’ as the original spotlight (pace Fine’s claim
to the contrary). Indeed, adding presentness to each moment sounds very much like
B-theory, where each moment is, likewise, present (though only relative to itself,
instead of absolute).
Recently, Oliver Pooley defended standard A-theory against Fine’s charge that
its present moment remains ‘frozen’, with the help of Prior’s account of presentist
passage. Change consists, on Prior’s tense-logical understanding (on which more
below), in the truth of tensed conjunctions like ‘‘b was G and b is not G’’. Since,
e.g., ‘‘Prior’s birth was 54 years ago, and his birth is now not 54 years ago’’ has the
very same form, it is also an instance of Priorian change—and Prior writes, with
regard to such a peculiar change:
This last change, of course, is a case of precisely that recession of events into
the past that we are really talking about when we say that time flows or passes
.... (Prior 1968a, p. 9)
Thus, Pooley says, if we adopt Prior’s tense-logical understanding of change, we
inherit a perfectly fine conception of the passage of time. He writes:
Footnote 31 continued
criticism, leading to the conclusion that the moving spotlight view endorses an eternalist take on ordinary
time and a presentist take on the extra temporal dimension that underlies the movement of the spotlight.
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The present, tensed facts include, for example, facts to the effect that certain
tensed propositions are not now true but that they were or will be true. One
simply cannot accept all the present, tensed truths without accepting that what
is true undergoes genuine change. (Pooley 2013, p. 330)
Pooley here seems to gesture towards an aspect of the original temporal nexus that
Fine failed to take into account: it lies in the very form of temporal truths that they
‘‘recede into the past’’. In other words, there are no tensed truths without passage.
(That is, in fact, the only way to arrive at a satisfactory non-reductive understanding
of the passage of time. I will come back to this thought in Sect. 7 below.) Notice,
however, that on Pooley’s way of putting things, this thought cannot be maintained.
For the thought that some tensed propositions ‘‘are not now true but were or will be
true’’ is itself simply a present-tensed proposition, located at the present moment,
and therefore suffers from the very same lack of cross-temporal integration of
temporal facts that I pointed out earlier. For all Pooley and Fine have told us, there
is no link whatsoever between today’s fact that ‘‘proposition p was true yesterday’’
and yesterday’s fact that ‘‘proposition p is true today’’. And without such a link,
there is nothing in today’s tensed facts that secures that ‘‘what is true undergoes
genuine change’’. But, again, I will return to this point in the next section; I will now
conclude this section by showing that Pooley’s understanding of temporal passage
suffers from a different (but related) flaw.
The way Pooley extends the understanding of passage he finds in Prior to Fine’s
non-standard A-theories shows that there is something strange going on:
Do non-standard views vindicate the passage of time? The first, obvious point
to make is that everything the presentist said was true absolutely remains true
relative to a particular temporal perspective. And everything the presentist
maintained was always true remains true relative to every temporal
perspective. Since time passes for the presentist, the same holds true, as of
any time, of the non-standard view. One of the view’s many perspectives is
supposed to be our perspective so we can truly say (now) that time passes.
(Pooley 2013, p. 335; emphasis added)
This line of thought is flawed. In so far as Prior’s presentist, tense-based
understanding of time’s passage is successful, it yields passage of time for the
presentist’s reality. Now, the one single reality of the presentist A-theorist is
identical to one of the many realities (or fragments) of the non-standard A-theorist.
However, contrary to what Pooley thinks, the imagined generalization of Prior’s
account then yields as many ‘moving nows’ as there are relative realities (or
fragments).32 By marrying the Priorian idea of understanding passage in terms tense
itself with the idea of a multitude of temporal locations (i.e., realities or fragments),
32 The point becomes especially vivid when considering the open future, for then what is taken to be
genuinely open relative to the present reality (say, whether or not there will be a sea battle tomorrow) is
not open relative to some future reality (in which a sea battle is raging, let us say). That seriously
compromises the sense in which the future is ‘open’.
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Pooley ends up with a host of different ‘passages’: a different ‘moving now’ for
each moment. That, however, makes nonsense of the very idea of time’s passage.33
One might think that this problem may also be blamed on the non-standard realisms,
instead of blaming it on Pooley’s understanding of passage. However, things are
more complicated: the extension to non-standard A-theories shows that the view of
passage in question is compatible with the idea of anchoring tensed facts to
locations on (a relativist/fragmentalist substitute for) the time line. And it is that
anchoring which creates the problem.
To sum up: there is a way of understanding the relation between tensed truths and
their respective moments that is just like the B-theoretic understanding of how
tenseless truths relate to their respective moments. The only difference is that for the
B-theorist the relevant temporal locations are built into the truths themselves,
whereas the A-theorist has to anchor them in some other way (by privileging the
present moment, or by endorsing a relativization or fragmentation of reality). Such
an understanding of tensed truths is as reductive as B-theory. In short, it matters a
great deal how one understands tense.
Perhaps presentism can enforce an understanding of tense that is not in line with
the B-theorist’s take on temporal location, simply because it denies the existence of
any temporal locations except for the present moment.
6 Presentism
As before, I will focus here on versions of presentism that are fully compatible with
the reductive view. It is, in fact, easy to construct a version of presentism that is just
an alternative to ‘orthodox’ eternalism, acceptable in principle to reductionists
(though most likely not preferable):
[C]onsider a view that starts with the eternalist’s picture of time and existence
at a time, and then ‘shaves off’ the past and the future, leaving only a thin
(instantaneous?) slice called ‘the present’. (Merricks 2007, p. 124)
Let us call this version of presentism negative presentism.34
I introduce it here because it is built not on a rejection of the eternalist
understanding of time but rather accepts it, as I will explain shortly. The negative
presentist’s reality collapses into one static snap-shot, and thus, as we should expect,
time’s passage remains a mystery, for nothing in this picture ensures that reality,
confined as it is to just one moment, changes. This is the counterpart, for negative
presentism, of the ‘frozenness’ of the spotlight we observed, with Fine, in the
previous section. (I return to the promising tense-based Priorian notion of passage
that Pooley called to his aid in the next section.)
33 In a recent paper that does not consider Fine’s or Pooley’s positions, Boccardi (2015, §5) asks ‘‘if at all
times presentness advances not at all, isn’t it miraculous that in a series of such static moments it manages
to advance?’’




Negative presentism helps us to pin down what it is about the eternalist picture of
a time line that makes it a reductive picture. It makes clear that the foundation of the
reductive view is not the extendedness of its eternalist time line. Rather, it is its very
understanding of what it is for something (be it an object, fact, truth, state of affairs
or something else) to exist at (hold at, be true of) some time or other.35 That
understanding is atemporal: time is supposed to be accounted for, reductively, by
the time line itself. Every moment in time comes with its own collection of objects
and/or truths; it is the relation amongst moments (in particular, their linear ordering)
that constitutes the basis for the reductionist’s understanding of time.
The moments are, thus, construed rather like instantaneous possible worlds,
ordered in a ‘temporal’ series. But such instantaneous ‘worlds’ are atemporal (recall
the Euclidean plane from Sect. 2). Time is reductively conceived of as a series of
atemporal instants—just as modality may be reductively conceived of in terms of a
range of a-modal possible worlds. The Humeanism in both conceptions is obvious:
all the instants (or worlds) are, at bottom, ‘loose and separate’; they can be
exhaustively described without reference to other instants (or worlds), using
atemporal predication only.
To describe what reality is like at one particular instant, it is natural to use
atemporal predication: time comes in only as one considers that instant in its
relations to other instants on the time line. This is the reason why an alternative
rendering of such B-theoretic facts as ‘tensed’ ones is of little help: if the underlying
understanding of how such facts relate to the time line remains the same, their
‘tensedness’ makes little difference—as my discussion of Fine’s versions of
A-theory in the previous section illustrated. Indeed, I will now show that this way of
understanding tense is reductive—which is to say that the basic, present-tensed facts
populating all the separate instants in fact involve the atemporal form of predication,
not the temporal form.
For concreteness, I consider an example: Bourne’s ‘ersatzist’ version of negative
presentism. He writes:
I propose we construct times using maximally consistent sets of u-proposi-
tions,36 which intuitively we can see as those u-propositions that are true at
that time. These propositions I take to give a complete, maximally specific,
description of what is true at that time. ... [These times] need to be ordered by
an ‘earlier than’ relation ..., in order for the ersatz time series to be structurally
similar to a real time series, so it can be taken to be a sufficient substitute.
(Bourne 2006, pp. 53–54)
Bourne thus replaces the eternalist’s ‘real’ time line with an ersatzist time line. One
point on this substitute time line is occupied by reality: the present moment. The
35 Merricks makes the same observation (2007, p. 124). The mistake, he thinks, lies in the assumption
that presentism and eternalism ‘agree about what it is to exist (and have properties) at the present time’
[p. 123]. I agree with this diagnosis—but not with Merricks’s positive view on temporal truth (see below).
See also Tallant (2014, §3), who adopts Merricks suggestion in developing his ‘Existence Presentism’,
according to which presence simply is existence.
36 Bourne defines ‘u-propositions’ to be atomic, present-tensed propositions.
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earlier-later relation that holds between all the times grounds the various past and
future truths at the various moments.37
Bourne reconstructs the eternalist’s reductive view on time by simulating the
very time line he does not want to countenance, as a presentist. Why? Because he
still holds on to the eternalist’s understanding of temporal truth, in terms of
locations on a time line.38 Given this eternalism-friendly understanding of temporal
truth, there appears to be no difference at all between the negative presentist’s
reality and a temporally thin eternalist reality.
For consider: the negative presentist’s time line shrinks to the size of one single
moment. He alleges this moment to be characterized by present-tensed truths
(Bourne’s u-propositions). An eternalist, B-theoretic but temporally thin reality
would incorporate atemporal truths concerning the only ‘moment’ that exists. So
why should we think that Bourne’s basic, allegedly present-tensed u-propositions
are any different from our imagined eternalist’s basic, atemporal propositions?
We should return, here, to the observation I made in the previous section
concerning Prior’s tense logic: it seems to capture only the interrelations between
tensed statements from one and the same temporal perspective, but it doesn’t
capture their dynamicity, their cross-temporal sameness. That is, Prior is expressing
something that goes beyond his own logic when he writes:
In tense logic the totalities of tensed propositions which are true at different
instants fit together into a system, so that although the total course of history
will be differently described at different times, the description at one time will
determine what the descriptions at other times will be. (Prior and Fine
1977, p. 38)
As Ro¨dl observes, considering an intellect that would only think thoughts of the
forms that tense logic describes:
Such an intellect is a totality of tense-logical contents, wherefore the system of
these totalities is not accessible to him. One instance follows the other, and
with it one totality takes the place of the previous one. ... The meaning of a
tense-logical sentence resides in the conditions under which ‘‘is-present true’’
applies to it, and these are different at different times. Hence, as time passes,
the meaning of all tense-logical sentences shifts. ... Since the meaning of all of
his sentences shifts, he has no means to say that it shifts. (Ro¨dl 2012, p. 106)
37 A similar presentist view has been defended by Crisp (2007).
38 Another, more proximate reason for Bourne to proceed as he does is the famous truthmaker argument
against presentism: if only present things exist, then what ‘makes true’ statements like ‘‘There were
dinosaurs’’ and ‘‘I admire Aristotle’s wit’’? This argument, and similar ones, are presently widely
discussed—see, e.g., Prior (1968a), De Clerq (2006), Fiocco (2007), Caplan and Sanson (2011), Baia
(2012), Baron (2012, 2013), Torrengo (2013, 2014), Asay and Baron (2014); Tallant (2014). Merricks
(2007, esp. ch. 6) contains a critical discussion that is particularly congenial to my project here. In terms
of the classification proposed by Sam Baron in a recent contribution (Baron 2015), Bourne’s account is a
form of ‘easy road’ presentism: invoking new entities that can act as truthmakers. Baron himself develops
‘middle road’ presentism, providing tensed truthmakers. Merricks defends what Baron calls ‘hard road’
presentism: he rejects truthmaker theory, writing that ‘no possible view can reconcile presentism with
Truthmaker’ (Merricks 2007, p. 138).
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Leaving the tense-logical intellect aside, we may say that a tense-logical reality is a
totality of tense-logical facts (Fine’s versions of A-theory being our primary
examples). Then, that yesterday’s p is the same as today’s Pp is something that
cannot be included in reality as an extra tense-logical fact: firstly because it will then
itself stand in need of being put into the system by way of further facts of cross-
temporal fact-sameness, leading to a regress39; secondly because p and Pp are
simply two different formulae (and not even equivalent); and thirdly because the
fact-sameness holds between facts in different tense-logical systems, not within one
such system.
These problems can be solved if p and Pp are not taken as fundamental. There
are, then, two options. First, one might read them as two perspectivally different
presentations of an underlying atemporal fact (say, p-at-t): that amounts to a
reductive, B-theoretic underpinning of the tensed facts. Alternatively, one might
read them as different presentations of an underlying temporal fact: that takes us
back from Prior’s tense logic to the original view itself. (In the next section below, I
will briefly sketch this latter view.)
Ro¨dl is thus making the point that, if we take Prior seriously when he says that
tense logic is ‘metaphysically fundamental’ (Prior and Fine 1977, p. 37), then there
cannot be, amongst the tensed facts themselves, a system into which the ‘totalities
of tensed propositions which are true at different instants fit together’, as Prior
claims.40 An understanding of tense along the lines of Prior’s tense logic is thus
incapable of uniting them across time. The lack of cross-temporal unity I observed
in the previous section (and above) finds its source in this peculiarity of Prior’s tense
logic. Fine’s analysis of versions of A-theory illustrates the point quite faithfully—
in particular his non-standard A-theories: how the relativist’s many realities and the
fragmentalist’s many fragments fit together into a system is never discussed by him.
Now, on the original view, a temporal truth will not be restricted to the present
tense: that same truth turns up in past-tense guise at a later moment. Indeed, to say
that it is a temporal truth is to say that this contrast of present and past applies to it.
Yet on the Priorian understanding of tense under discussion, present-tensed
propositions are basic, and the other tenses are understood as constructions on their
basis, using certain modal operators. Compare modal propositions, which are, on a
reductive view on modality, to be understood as constructions out of a-modal
propositions and modal operators. Hence, as Ro¨dl observes:
[If] a present tense formula is elementary, then the contrast to the
corresponding past tense formula is not part of its [content], and without
this contrast, ‘‘present’’ has no temporal meaning. (Ro¨dl 2012, p. 107)
That is why Bourne’s ersatzist version of negative presentism collapses into an
eternalist understanding of a temporally thin reality. He may say that his u-
39 As Wittgenstein notes in Zettel 693, the problem of an infinite regress is not so much its infinity but
rather its disabling any understanding of its members. See Wittgenstein (1967), and see also Ro¨dl
(2007, p. 25).
40 To be sure, a more sympathetic reading of Prior would take him to be saying that what tense logic aims
to capture is metaphysically fundamental. Ro¨dls’s observation then merely indicates that tense logic as is
does not fulfill this aim.
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propositions are present-tensed, but his Priorian understanding of tense prevents him
from actually getting at the temporal form of predication.
Unfortunately, for Prior, his heroic attempt at a rigorous and non-reductive
account of time turns out to provide very sophisticated materials for unorthodox
reductive takes on temporal thoughts that resemble the temporal form of predication
to such an extent that they confuse even those with strong anti-reductionist leanings
(such as Prior himself, and Fine).41
I have introduced negative presentism, and collected some observations to show
that it amounts to no more than an alternative to orthodox, eternalist reductionism.
In doing so, I have also uncovered the key to a positive presentism, a version of
presentism that really gets us out of the reductionist’s desert landscapes and into the
full jungle of the original view. The key is a proper understanding of the temporal
form of predication: one that is inherently dynamic, and hence makes nonsense of
the very attempt to tie temporal truths to locations on a time line (be it a real or an
ersatz one). In other words, the key is the temporal form of predication itself.42
7 Original Time Revisited
I have looked at versions of endurantism, A-theory, and presentism that turned out
to be mere variations of a reductive understanding of time in terms of the atemporal
form of predication. Along the way, I criticized popular ingredients of such views—
in particular, Prior’s tense logic. I should stress that my survey was in no way
intended to be comprehensive. How extant varieties of endurantism, A-theory and
presentism are to be classified—as ‘unorthodox’ versions of the reductive approach,
or rather as versions of the original view—remains an open question. As said, it was
my aim to contribute to a better understanding of the relevant debates, not to settle
things one way or another in all cases.
That said, I should say something about the sense in which presentism, A-theory,
and endurantism relate to the original view. As my discussion has made clear, we
can only do so if we consider how these three elements of the original view can be
developed on its own basis—on the basis of the temporal form of predication, that
is.
Consider, one after the other, sentences A and B:
A Your eyes are fixed on sentence A.
B Your eyes were fixed on sentence A.
While you were reading sentence A, sentence A was true. Then you moved on to
reading sentence B: B was also true. A and B were subsequently true: when A was
41 Here, I should also include Merricks, who, despite rejecting the temporal-location view of temporal
existence (as I noted in fn. 35 above), still adheres to the Priorian time-relative understanding of tensed
truths. Indeed, he seems to treat the time-relativity of temporal truths to be definitive of presentism—see
Merrick (2007, p. 75).
42 In my (2016), I have attempted to apply considerations such as the ones sketched in this section to the
current debate on how best to define presentism.
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true, B was not yet true. Still, they expressed the very same temporal truth: that your
eyes were fixed on sentence A. The sentences express different truths (or
falsehoods) on different occasions, and hence can be said to vary in truth value
across time. But the truths (and falsehoods) themselves remain true (and false)—the
facts, of course, don’t change. It’s just that time passes, and its passage consists in
temporal truths being the sorts of truths they are: dynamic. That is the kernel of truth
in Prior’s tense-based conception of passage, which I mentioned in Sect. 5 above.43
Now, first, temporal truths are temporal because of the special form of
predication that they involve. Thus, the original view includes A-theory, albeit in a
perhaps unusual way. Secondly, such temporal truths do not earn their status as
temporal by occupying a location on a time line. Rather, the latter notion is an
abstraction from the nature of temporal truth—one that makes it (usefully)
suitable for formal modeling, we may add.44 Thus, the original temporal nexus
includes presentism—not in the negative sense defined in the previous section in
terms of erasing part of the time line, but in a positive sense that replaces the
reductive time line picture with the dynamic unity of temporal truths.45
To get to the third conclusion—that the original temporal nexus includes
endurantism—we need to take into account the aspectual characteristic of the
temporal form of predication, to which the formal concept of process corresponds,
in order to see that such process requires constancy. Consider, one after the other,
sentences A0 and B0:
A0 You are reading sentence A0.
B0 You have read sentence A0.
It is you (and sentence A0) who remains constant through the described process of
taking in sentence A0. Although a further exploration of process and related causal
concepts on the basis of the original temporal nexus lies beyond the scope of the
present paper, we can already see that a sense in which temporal objects are
43 In other words: whether or not something is true is, fundamentally, an atemporal matter. Truths don’t
cease to be true. As we noted, on Prior’s tense logic truth is time-relative, as is made explicit in that its
model-theory requires a moment as a parameter of truth. That is how it isolates tense from its cross-
temporal sameness, as I observed. For a powerful defense of this understanding of temporal truth, see
Ro¨dl (2012, esp. ch. 2, §2). That defense is criticized by Friebe (2012, §I.A.2.1), who follows Mellor
(1998, p. 30) in concluding from the suggestion that a pair of tensed sentences such as A and B express
the same truth, that that truth has to be a B-theoretic truth. That, however, merely shows how entrenched
the assimilation of temporal predication with Prior’s tense logic has become: if truth is not time-relative,
then only B-theory remains. And that is a non sequitur.—Of course, the above merely shows that the
temporal form of predication requires the passage of time; it does not properly develop that idea.
44 There are interesting things to say on the relations between models of tense logic (such as branching
times) and temporal reality itself—things that bear on the relation between formal modeling and the
original temporal nexus. See Pooley (2013, §VI, esp. p. 339) for some elucidating considerations.
45 The truthmaker argument thereby loses its bite. In fact, the original temporal nexus invites a rather
unusual but quite literal kind of ‘truthmaker theory’: as time passes, more and more statements are made
true or false—in the sense that things get settled one way or the other. Once made true, these truths
remain true: truth itself is atemporal. Note that this implies that, although there are no future contingent
truths, all the future necessities are already made true.
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‘diachronically identical’ emerges. Thus, the original temporal nexus includes
endurantism.46
I have elaborated and defended my thesis: that the fundamental issue to which
various debates in the metaphysics of time can be brought back is the question
whether we should accept as basic the original temporal nexus, or rather go for a
reductive analysis of that conceptual nexus in terms of the atemporal form of
predication. If my considerations are on the right track, it is clear that those debates
can be more fruitfully pursued when viewed explicitly in this light. In particular, the
paradigms that many opponents of orthodox four-dimensionalist reductionism
frequently allude to, such as Prior’s tense logic, should be critically re-assessed in
order to clarify their relationship to the original view and to the reductive project.
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